Johnson details how the Japanese frightened the supposed world powers twice; once when its destroyers helped decimate the Russian Fleet in , and again in when its far superior Fubuki class destroyer was introduced.
Great Britain might not have lasted through had the U. It was disarmament talks in the s that ironically allowed the U. Still, those remaining WW-I era destroyers played major roles in winning WW II when many were converted to fast attack transports, mine layers, mine sweepers, and seaplane tenders. It was British Destroyer men who captured the first German Enigma machines and codes to help break the German codes and help convoys plan safer routes across the Atlantic.
It was British destroyer men who sank 10 of the entire German fleet of 22 destroyers in one battle. Finally, it was American destroyers which scored the first American surface action victory at Balikpapan in January ; which pushed back the Japanese reinforcement efforts at Guadalcanal for six months; which provided close-in support for the Normandy landings; which raced into overwhelming odds at Leyete Gulf in October ; and which spotted the kamikazes for the rest of the Navy for the last eight months of the war.
On Feb. Only 12 crewmen survived out of the seamen and officers. What both these sinkings should emphasize is that the men lost are not numbers but fathers, husbands and sons.
Despite the acrid, burning powder smoke which seared his lungs with each agonizing breath, he worked rapidly and with instinctive sureness and succeeded in quickly extinguishing the fires and in cooling the cases and bulkheads, thereby preventing further damage to the stricken ship.
He did this act of courage knowing that he would likely die. In Oct. On Oct. Of the 30 destroyers at Pearl during the attack, just two were destroyed. They would go on to earn battle stars. The Navy christened the Zumwalt —set it afloat—in , in a scaled-down ceremony that had been delayed by budget squabbles in Washington. Three years later, the Navy commissioned the Zumwalt in a Baltimore ceremony that officially brought it into the fleet. The admiral getting the ship was pleased, too.
But Pentagon overseers were less impressed. For a ship powered by electricity, outsider experts found its electrical system shocking. It will take a significant amount of time to recover and restore basic command and control operations placing the ship at risk. Buying and building a U. Navy warship is no easy task, even for relatively simple vessels. The Navy misled both lawmakers and taxpayers.
Under Congressional pressure, the Navy changed the official date it took possession of the Zumwalt from May to May , after its combat systems were aboard and working.
Military careers are made by officers able to push problems down the line; all the incentives are rigged to mask, rather than fix, shortfalls. When pushing the war-fighting envelope, cost overruns can happen, especially when they are rooted in unwarranted optimism when it comes to capabilities, cost and schedule. The move to the more optimistic estimates will allow the services to begin more programs than they can afford, Pentagon officials say.
In , in fact, it was able to meet only 44 percent of their requests. Political judgments are needed to weigh the risks the nation is willing to face when it trims its sails. The Navy has been trying to do more with less, leading to disastrous results highlighted by two collisions in the Pacific that killed 17 U.
The Navy likes to say that the lessons learned in DDG will be applied to future warships, perhaps salvaging some of the investment. The Navy also can keep its ships sailing longer. The service lusts after new platforms, and routinely retires ships early to free up funding for new ones. But the Navy, apparently recognizing the economic folly of such premature mothballing, announced in April that instead of retiring its Burke destroyers after 35 or 40 years, it plans to keep them steaming for Congress and the Department of Defense have mandated or implemented various reform efforts that have led to some improvements, but poor outcomes tend to persist in shipbuilding programs.
The Congressional watchdog highlighted a permanent Pentagon problem. No one has paid a price for the disaster that is the Zumwalt class; in fact, many were promoted. Pilling died in A POGO investigation found that from to the present over high-ranking Department of Defense officials and military officers became lobbyists, board members, executives, or consultants for defense contractors within two years of leaving the Department.
Retired Admiral Jay Johnson, the chief of naval operations from to , ended up in charge of General Dynamics , which owns Bath Iron Works, from to The money the Navy routinely squanders in its shipbuilding accounts is dulling the ability of the service to continue its historic role of guaranteeing free trade on the high seas.
As tensions continue to mount with China in the South China Sea, the Navy will struggle to deal with Beijing while simultaneously handling other maritime challenges.
Yet buying refreshed Reagan-era Burke destroyers and keeping an aging fleet steaming longer are only stopgap measures. That should make every taxpayer nervous. After all, 25 years ago the Navy began what became the Zumwalt class when it launched what it called its Surface Combatant for the 21st Century effort.
The Navy has recently begun work on its next generation of warships. This time around, the service is calling it the Future Surface Combatant program. But we can only continue to do this with your help. Center for Defense Information. Read more. Fewer Sailors Cutting the crew size is one thing the Zumwalt class was able to do. In the two to five seconds required to deposit laser energy on a target, a Mach 4 missile will travel only about 3. How Did This Happen? Read our report, Brass Parachutes: The Problem of the Pentagon Revolving Door A POGO investigation found that from to the present over high-ranking Department of Defense officials and military officers became lobbyists, board members, executives, or consultants for defense contractors within two years of leaving the Department.
Read More. The Real Price The money the Navy routinely squanders in its shipbuilding accounts is dulling the ability of the service to continue its historic role of guaranteeing free trade on the high seas.
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